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Whenever two or more market participants collaborate to restrain trade,
the potential applicability of federal and state antitrust laws must be
considered. When the collaborating parties are insurance companies, a further
layer of analysis may be necessary to determine whether the activity is exempt
from federal antitrust regulation. Even if the activity enjoys an exemption,
state antitrust law may have different things to say about the activity.
Embedded in each of these levels of analysis are many difficult and complex
subsidiary questions. In short, the law of insurance antitrust is not a subject
for the faint of heart.
Antitrust law often has implications in situations where its relevance is
least expected, as many who have credentials as antitrust offenders know well.
For example, with respect to whether insurers should surrender their option to
use genetic information in life insurance underwriting,1 a seemingly
reasonable, innocuous suggestion might be made:

1. As of 2002, forty-five states have some kind of statutory regulation with respect to
genetic testing in health insurance, including limitations on insurer requirements that testing
occur, insurer requests for information about past tests, or insurer use of the information in
making eligibility or renewal decisions, setting rates, or underwriting. See 2 NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, COMPENDIUM OF STATES LAWS ON INSURANCE

Topics, HE-43-1 et seq. (2002) (compendium of laws on genetic testing for insurance
coverage). Only a few of these statutes are relevant to life insurance. Arizona declares it an
unfair trade practice in life insurance to consider a genetic condition in determining rates, terms
or conditions of a policy, or to reject an application based on a genetic condition, unless the
applicant's medical history and condition and claims experience or actuarial projections
establish that substantial differences in claims are likely to result from the genetic condition.
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-448 (West 2002). See also CAL. INS. CODE § 10146-10149.1
(West Supp. 2002) (establishing standards for underwriting life and disability insurance on the
basis of genetic characteristics); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2159-C (West 2000) (stating
that life insurers may not unfairly discriminate based on the results of a genetic test); MASS.
GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 175, § 120E (West. Supp. 2002) (stating that a life insurer may not
unfairly discriminate in any of the terms of the policy based on genetic information). Montana
has a statute that applies to all lines of insurance, including life insurance. The law makes it an
unfair trade practice to consider genetic information and imposes restrictions on use of genetic
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Life insurers should voluntarily agree to place a
moratorium on the use of genetic information in underwriting.
Presently, no insurer makes use of such information, so now is
the time to forge such an agreement, before some insurers
begin to use the information and then become unwilling to
forego the practice. 2
But such a moratorium is essentially an agreement among competing insurers
to fix one determinant of the product's price, and this restraint of trade calls
into question the possible applicability of federal and state antitrust law (as
well as the relevance of possible exemptions under federal or state law, or
both).3 This Article discusses the antitrust issues that would accompany the

information to reject an application. MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-206 (2001). N.J. STAT. ANN. §
17B:30-12(f) (West Supp. 2002) (stating that life insurers may not unfairly discriminate in the
application of the results of a genetic test or genetic information in the issuance, withholding,
extension, or renewal of a policy); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4724(7)(D) (Supp. 2001) (stating
that it is unfair discrimination to condition rates or renewal practices on the results of genetic
testing absent a relationship between the medical information and the insurance risk). A few
other states have statutes relating to informed consent in testing and refusal to issue a policy
based on the sickle cell trait, a specific kind of genetic information. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 58-58-25 (1999) (sickle cell trait); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2612 (McKinney 2000) (titled "Genetic
testing written informed consent").
2. Whether life insurance companies should commit to forbear from using (or be
compelled to make such a commitment, or be flatly prohibited from using) genetic information
in underwriting is a difficult, controversial question. This Article takes no position on that
threshold question and instead simply assumes that the question has been answered in favor of
restricting insurers' use of genetic information (defined here as the results of DNA testing) in
life insurance underwriting.
What constitutes "genetic information" is, of course, another extremely important
question. Family history is a form of genetic information and medical files (with information
from routine physical exams, blood tests, urine tests, etc.) contain genetic information, but this
Article takes it as a foregone conclusion that insurers will not surrender, except under legal
compulsion, the right to use family history and medical information, even if it is genetic in
nature, that the industry has used in underwriting for many years. Thus, unless stated
otherwise, this Article treats "genetic information" as referring to the results of DNA and RNA
tests.
3. Another way to impose the restriction is via direct statutory regulation of insurer
practices, as some states have done. See supra note 1. As discussed below, this approach
presents no antitrust perils to life insurers. Likewise, if life insurers act unilaterally to forswear
the use of genetic information in underwriting (a scenario which, at least for the present, is very
unlikely to unfold), no antitrust problems are created. See, e.g., Theatre Enters., Inc. v.
Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540 (1954) ("crucial question is whether
respondents' conduct toward petitioner stemmed from independent decision [which does not
violate antitrust law] or from an agreement, tacit or express"); In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig.,
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articulation and implementation of such restrictions.4
The discussion in this Article is divided into four parts. Part I summarizes
the landscape, past and present, with respect to insurer collaboration in
underwriting. Part II considers whether, absent an antitrust exemption, multiinsurer agreements and collaborative insurer standard-setting with respect to
underwriting violate federal antitrust law. This Part also evaluates whether
insurers, to the extent potential federal liability exists, enjoy any kind of
statutory or judicial exemption from federal law for such activities. Part III
considers the same questions addressed in Part II but in the context of state
antitrust laws. Because antitrust law, including the law of antitrust
exemptions, is so vast and intricate, the discussion in this Article must
necessarily be cursory in many respects. But the discussion will be detailed
enough to provide a sense of the complexities involved in assessing the
validity of a multi-insurer compact on the use of underwriting criteria.
Finally, Part IV discusses the implications of the sometimes tentative
conclusions in Parts II and III for collaborative insurer activity in this area.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF INSURER COLLABORATION IN UNDERWRITING
There are many situations in which insurers collaborate. Insurers have
long cooperated in drafting standardized policy forms, sharing data regarding
the identification and quantification of risks, and collecting and disseminating
loss and expense data.5 There is also a long tradition of cooperation in the
setting of rates in the fire and casualty lines.6 For the most part, as discussed

166 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 1999) (escalation of prices in oligopolistic but competitive market is not
enough to show violation of section 1of the Sherman Act); Hise v. Philip Morris, Inc., 46 F.
Supp. 2d 1201 (N.D. Okla. 1999) (violation of section 1 was not established where a lack of
evidence excluded the possibility that companies acted independently of each other for
legitimate and reasonable business interest of passing costs of tobacco settlement on to
consumers). If, however, life insurers should agree among themselves not to use genetic
information in underwriting, a complex set of questions, which are the focus of this Article, is
presented.
4. Necessarily, some of the discussion is this Article is more broadly relevant to insurer
agreements in any line of insurance with respect to any kind of underwriting factor.
5. See generally THE INSURANCE ANTITRUST HANDBOOK: A PROJECT OF THE INSURANCE
INDUSTRY COMMITTEE, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW 41-86, 113-24 (Mark F. Homing & Roger
W. Langsdorf, eds., 1995) (hereafter INSURANCE ANTITRUST HANDBOOK).
6. For more discussion refer to Memorandum from Tim Wagner on Insurance Rating
Bureaus (July 2, 2002), availableat
http://www.naic.org/l committee/ImproveState_Based-wg/jirfinal 110300.pdf (last visited
March 1, 2003).
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in more detail below, these collaborative activities have been exempted from
federal antitrust scrutiny by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 7 Similar exemptions
at the state level8 to the application of state antitrust laws have also protected
these practices.
There are, however, very few industry precedents for collaborative insurer
agreement or standard-setting with respect to the use or non-use of particular
underwriting criteria in setting the terms of insurance coverage or the price
charged for it (or both). The absence of such examples is not surprising. If a
particular underwriting factor is actuarially unsound, no compact is needed to
discourage insurers from using it. If a particular underwriting factor is
actuarially sound, insurers will be loathe to surrender their ability to use it in
underwriting, and there is no advantage to be accrued from arranging a
compact among insurers pursuant to which all agree to use the underwriting
factor.
Even in the relatively rare circumstances where such a compact might be
perceived to have advantages, evidence of multi-insurer collaboration is
difficult to find. Until the mid-1960s, insurers used race-distinct actuarial
tables in life insurance underwriting; it is probably not coincidental that raceneutral tables became the norm around the time of the enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 9 Information about this transformation is sparse,10 but the
industry probably understood that this underwriting practice would be
prohibited if it were not voluntarily abandoned." Moreover, a federal
prohibition would constitute a toehold for more expansive federal regulation
at a time when the industry generally preferred the existing system of state
regulation. In the circumstances of the mid-i 960s, it would not be surprising
if life insurers agreed through some kind of industry standard or articulated
"guiding principles" to abandon the use of race in underwriting, but there is no
evidence of life insurers acting in concert to bring about this result.

7. See discussion infra Part C. 1.
8. See discussion infra Part C.2.
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h (1994).
10. See Robert H. Jerry, II & Kyle B. Mansfield, Justifying Unisex Insurance: Another
Perspective, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 329, 352 n.139 (1985) (discussing the transformation with
citation to some contemporary commentaries on insurer practices).
11. From time to time, evidence of race-based pricing turns up in the market, which is
surprising given the opprobrium with which it is held. See Jim Connolly, NAICActs on RaceBased Premium Rates, NAT'L UNDERWRITER (LIFE-HEALTH), June 19, 2000, at 3; Minority
Policyholders Win Settlement From Unitrinon Race-BasedPremium, 12 ANDREwS INS. CoV.
LITIG. REP. 13 (May 17, 2002).
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Likewise, when some insurer trade organizations went on record opposing
the use of sexual orientation in underwriting in the mid-i 980s, one might have
anticipated that some insurers would collaborate to implement the public
positions of the organizations to which they belonged. There is, however, no
evidence that this occurred. When the AIDS epidemic emerged in the mid1980s, the largest single group of AIDS victims were gay men with samegender sexual experiences. Many insurers responded by attempting to identify
the sexual orientation of applicants for the purpose of excluding all gay men
from their risk pools, even though the overwhelming majority of gay men
would never become AIDS victims. 2 In 1985, the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners 13 appointed an Advisory Committee on AIDS; this
committee undertook to draft guidelines relating to appropriate underwriting
practices. The Committee worked on draft "Medical/Lifestyle Questions and
Underwriting Guidelines" throughout 1986, and the NAIC approved the
Guidelines at its December 9, 1986 meeting. The Guidelines forbade life and
health insurers from inquiring into an applicant's sexual orientation or using
sexual orientation in the underwriting process and also condemned the use of
factors such as gender, marital status, living arrangements, occupation,
beneficiary designations, medical history, and zip code or other territorial
identifiers as substitutes for questions about an individual's sexual
orientation. 14 The Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) and the
American Council on Life Insurance (ACLI), two associations of insurance
companies that were represented on the Committee, supported the
Guidelines.' 5 There is no evidence, however, of any agreement among

12. See Benjamin Schatz, The AIDS Insurance Crisis: Underwritingor Overreaching?,

100 HARv. L. REv. 1782, 1783-88 (1987).
13. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) is an association of the
chief regulatory official of the fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the United States
territories. It was organized in 1871. Through its staff and various committees, it proposes
model laws and regulations for possible adoption by the states, studies problems of insurance
regulation, gathers and distributes information on regulatory problems, and maintains financial
data for the purpose of detecting insurer insolvency at an early stage. See ROBERT H. JERRY, II,
UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 23[b], 127-28 (3d ed. 2002).
14. See NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS & GUIDELINES, Medical/Lifestyle Questions

and Underwriting Guidelines, §60-1 et seq. (1988, 2002).
15. In December 1986, the two associations submitted a joint report explaining the
associations' opposition to prohibitions on HIV testing of applicants by insurance companies.
This report also endorsed the model guidelines. See Health Insurance Association of America
& American Council of Life Insurance, Statement to the Health Insurance Committee of the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners on Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
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insurance companies to refrain from particular underwriting practices with
16
respect to HIV testing or from the use of sexual orientation in underwriting.
Thus, although insurers collaborate in many aspects of the insurance
business, there is little precedent for insurer collaboration with respect to
underwriting criteria. How the antitrust laws would apply to this kind of
concerted conduct, if it were to occur, is discussed in the next section.
II. THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND ANTICOMPETITIVE INSURER
CONDUCT

A. Overview. The FederalAntitrust Framework
The federal antitrust statute with the most relevance to the insurance
industry is the Sherman Act, the substance of which rests in two brief but
sweeping provisions enacted by Congress in 1890. Section 1 is the "restraint
of trade" provision; it is relevant to many kinds of collaborative conduct,
including horizontal restraints among competitors. Section I states: "Every
contract, combination... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is... illegal."' 7 Section 2,
the "monopoly abuse" provision, states: "Every person who shall monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... ,"

The

presence of monopoly power (classically defined as "the power to control
prices or exclude competition")' 9 is not enough to make out a violation of
section 2; rather, the offender must possess monopoly power plus engage in

(AIDS) and the Recommendations of the NAIC Advisory Committee on AIDS, Dec. 9, 1986
(unpublished report) (on file with the author).
16. The Advisory Committee's December 9, 1986 report records broad support by all
members of the Committee, including the industry representatives, for the proposition that
inquiries into sexual orientation or use of sexual orientation as an underwriting factor were
inappropriate "and should not be allowed." The Report also clearly records that industry
representatives were opposed to any restrictions on prior test history or to prohibitions on
testing for underwriting purposes. The Advisory Committee was never able to reach a
consensus on the testing issue. See 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS 609, 657-59 (1987).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
18. Id.§2.
19. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
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anticompetitive conduct to obtain, use, or preserve it. 20 Because most
insurance markets do not have a single insurer with dominant market power,
section 2 has less practical importance to the insurance industry than section
1.21 Regardless, section 1 is the provision relevant to concerted insurer
conduct to eliminate use of one or more underwriting factors when
determining coverage or premium levels.
The statutory language of the Sherman Act depends on judicial
interpretation and construction for its content.22 As the Court stated in Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader,23 "[t]he prohibitions of the Sherman Act were not
stated in terms of precision or of crystal clarity and the Act itself did not
define them. In consequence of the vagueness of its language.. . the courts
have been left to give content to the statute. ' 24 But in doing so, courts must
adhere to the Act's purpose: "The Sherman Act was designed to be a
comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and
unfettered competition as the rule of trade.... [T]he policy unequivocally laid
down by the Act is competition. 25
Other federal antitrust laws have potential relevance to the insurance
industry. Congress passed The Clayton Act in 1914 to compensate for the
Sherman Act's perceived failure to remedy anticompetitive conduct before it
occurred.26 The two most important provisions of the Clayton Act for the
insurance industry are section seven,2 7 which prohibits mergers and
acquisitions that may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a

20. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (noting that a section
2 violation requires monopoly power and "the willful acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly]
power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident.").

21. See INSURANCE

ANTITRUST HANDBOOK,

supra note 5, at 18.

22. In this regard, the Sherman Act has been compared to the Bill of Rights, which also
depends on judicial interpretation for determining the content of its short but sweeping
provisions. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) ("Antitrust laws ... are
the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic
freedom and our free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our
fundamental personal freedoms.").
23. 310U.S.469(1940).
24. Id. at 489.
25. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
26. JOHN H. SHENEFIELD & IRWIN M. STELZER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS: A PRIMER 15, 21
(1993) (the substance of the Clayton Act tends to "look to the future and require a prediction of
probable anticompetitive effect.").

27. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
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monopoly, and section 8,28 which prohibits with some exceptions the officers
and directors of one corporation from serving in the same capacity at a
competing corporation. The Clayton Act is not relevant to horizontal
restraints among competitors in underwriting, but potentially relevant is the
Federal Trade Commission Act, passed by Congress in 1914. Section 5(a)(1)
of the FTC Act, as subsequently amended, gives the Commission the authority
to regulate "[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce," a
standard that includes conduct that violates either the letter or spirit of other
antitrust laws.29
Whether challenged insurer activity violates any of these antitrust laws is
a question that, at least in theory, is preliminary to whether the insurer activity
enjoys an exemption from federal antitrust law. Although the analysis needed
to determine the applicability of an exemption can be very complicated,
sometimes deciding the exemption question is easier than determining whether
the challenged conduct is an antitrust violation. 30 Thus, it can be expedient to
proceed initially to the exemption analysis rather than grapple with the
question of antitrust liability. The following discussion, however, visits the
antitrust liability issue first and then proceeds to the exemptions.
B. HorizontalRestraints and Section 1 of the Sherman Act
1. Elements of Section 1
The text of section 1 begins with the phrase "contract, combination.., or
conspiracy."' 3' Each term in the phrase requires cooperative conduct by at
least two actors-either two (or more) sellers, two (or more) buyers, or a seller
and buyer (or more) in combination.3 2 In some circumstances, this concerted

28. Id. § 19.
29. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 320-21 (1966) (FTC "has
broad powers to declare trade practices unfair," particularly with respect to "trade practices
which conflict with the basic policies of the Sherman and Clayton Acts even though such
practices may not actually violate these laws"); At. Ref. Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 381 U.S.
357, 369 (1965) (FTC Act declares unlawful practices that exhibit the same "central
competitive characteristic[s]" as those which constitute Sherman Act violations); Fed. Trade
Comm'n v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 694 (1948) (violations of the Sherman Act also
constitute violations of the FTC Act).
30. Note, however, that even if the exemption issue is decided first, concluding that the
insurer's conduct enjoys an antitrust exemption does not establish that the conduct is unlawful
in the absence of an exemption.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
32. SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 26, at 15.
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action requirement can be met by the activity of a trade association or similar
group.33 The reference to "several States, or with foreign nations" means that
the trade restrained by the concerted action must be either in or at least have
an effect upon interstate or foreign commerce; incidental commerce that is
entirely intrastate in character and impact is not the concern of section 1.34
Because every contract restrains trade by obligating the contracting parties to
deal only with each other with respect to the contract's subject matter, a literal
reading of section 1 would invalidate all contracts, an obviously untenable
result. 35 In 1911, the United States Supreme Court, drawing upon the
common law of unfair competition, interpreted section 1 as only prohibiting
unreasonable restraints of trade,36 and this reading of section 1 has been
reiterated on numerous subsequent occasions.3 7
The meaning of "unreasonable restraint" has evolved along two lines.
First, "there are certain agreements or practices which because of their
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable., 38 These kinds of restraints-such
as direct price-fixing, bid-rigging, division of markets among competitors,
some kinds of boycotts (i.e., concerted refusals by competitors with market
power to deal with third parties), and resale price maintenance-are deemed to
be "unreasonable per se."39 The logic of this categorization is that courts have
determined from past experience that some kinds of restraints are so
fundamentally anti-competitive and so lacking in justification that no analysis
beyond the determination of the fact of the existence of the restraint is
necessary to determining invalidity.
The second line of analysis is known as the "rule of reason." With respect
to any activity that is notperse unreasonable, the relevant circumstances must

33. See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988);
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Broad. Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); E. States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v.
United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
34. SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 26, at 15.
35. See Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("the legality of an
agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains
competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.").
36. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
37. See, e.g., Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984);
Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690(1978).
38. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
39. Id. at 9.
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be evaluated to determine whether the conduct is, on balance, pro-competitive
or anti-competitive. 40 The rule of reason is "the prevailing standard" under
section 1 of the Sherman Act and is the "standard traditionally applied for the
majority of anticompetitive practices" challenged under that provision.4' For
example, a bona fide joint venture (to be distinguished from a "sham" joint
venture, which is a subterfuge for an agreement to fix prices and is therefore
unreasonable per se) may be a legitimate effort to achieve efficiencies that
promote, rather than stifle, competition.42 Most "vertical" agreements (i.e.,
agreements between companies at different levels of product distribution, such
as a manufacturer and wholesaler)-as distinct from "horizontal" agreements
(i.e., agreements among competitors)-are tested under the rule of reason.43
Although an agreement to fix one or more components of price may be aper
se violation, "courts have applied the rule of reason rather than theper se rule
where . . . the relationship between the restraint and price is sufficiently
attenuated." 44 Social considerations are generally excluded from rule of
reason analysis: "[b]ecause the rule of reason focuses on the restraint's
competitive effect, factors unrelated to competition-with possible rare
exceptions for health and safety considerations and for deviations from the
traditional profit-maximizing business model such as ' the professions,
municipalities, and universities-are generally irrelevant. S
2. Underwriting Collaboration as Price Fixing
Because "[p]rotection of price competition from conspiratorial restraint is
an object of special solicitude under the antitrust laws," 4 courts have
generally "declared unlawful per se agreements among competitors to raise,
lower, stabilize, or otherwise set or determine prices. 4 7 To constitute

40. See Nat'lSoc'y ofProflEng'rs,435 U.S. at 691 (an inquiry under the rule of reason is
limited to whether the restraint "is one that promotes competition or one that suppresses
competition.").
41. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988).
42. INSURANCE ANTITRUST HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 13-14.
43. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 79 (5th ed. 2002)
[hereinafter ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS].
44. Id. at 82.
45. Id. at 54.
46. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 148 (1966).
47. ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 43, at 82. The three verbs--"raise,"
"lower" and "stabilize"--come from the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940). See, e.g., Ariz. v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y,
457 U.S. 332 (1982); Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980).
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horizontal price fixing, the agreement need not involve an agreement among
competitors about the ultimate price; on the contrary, "[a]ny combination
'4 8
which tampers with price structures is engaged in an unlawful activity.
Thus, any factor relevant to the ultimate cost to the consumer-such as credit
terms, trade-in allowances, cash down payment requirements, discounts, free
service, or any other element of price-which is the subject of competitor
agreement can constitute a per se unlawful restraint.49 Other less direct
connections between the activity and price-such as agreements to use
specific accounting methods, to require a percentage contribution from each
contract to an industry-wide collective bargaining fund, to use only particular
subcontractors, etc.-have also been deemed per se violations of section 1.50
Agreements to "fix some element of price or the process by which price is
determined.., do not fix the price as such, [but] they do require participants
to compute the price in a certain way . . . . Once such an agreement is
appropriately
classified as naked, per se condemnation follows as a matter of
51
course."
Allegations of concerted action are not always based on alleged formal
agreements among competitors. Frequently, such allegations are based on
patterns of uniform business conduct, which is commonly referred to as
"conscious parallelism. '' 52 As one treatise explains, "lower courts have
consistently held that conscious parallelism, by itself, will not support a

48. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940).
49. The leading case for this proposition is Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S.
643 (1980). For more discussion, see ANTInRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 43, at 84.
50. See ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 43, at 85-86.
51. 12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW & 2020, at 121-22 (1999). See UNR
Indus., Inc. v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 607 F. Supp. 855, 859-60 (N.D. Ill. 1984):
[Pier se status . . . has been conferred on price-fixing not merely
because it harms consumers (which it does) but because it harms consumers
in a particular way-by (almost always) restraining competition .... The
price-fixing label can by analogy attach to conduct more subtle than a simple
conspiracy to directly fix prices... but the analogy is successful only if the
challenged conduct is, like traditional price-fixing, virtually certain to reduce
competition.
Id.
52. See, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) (noting that a pattern
of unexplained parallel conduct by three tobacco companies supported finding of conspiracy);
Interstate Cir., Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939) (pattern of uniform conduct among
motion picture distributors that had imposed nearly identical restraints was sufficient to permit
the inference of the existence of an agreement).
See generally ANTITRUST LAW
DEVELOPMENTS,

supra note 43, at 9-16.
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finding of concerted action .... [O]ther facts and circumstances, often
referred to as 'plus factors,' typically must be combined with evidence of
conscious parallelism to support an inference of concerted action. 53 The
presence of legitimate business reasons that would lead firms to independently
follow the same course of action or the absence of motive for a conspiracy
exemplify the kinds of considerations that will rebut the allegation of
conscious parallelism. 54 Insurers tend to compete rather than cooperate with
respect to risk classification determinations.55 Therefore, it is improbable that
a "conscious parallelism" argument would succeed with respect to such
determinations. Thus, if antitrust claims are to have viability, it will be with
respect to demonstrated, formal collaborations among insurers.
Applying the foregoing general principles to collaborations among
insurers presents no special difficulties. In insurance, the product is the
insurance policy, and the price of the product is the premium. Thus, if
insurers agree among themselves to fix the level of insurance premiums, they
are engaged in price-fixing in violation of the Sherman Act; unless the
anticompetitive conduct earns an antitrust exemption, the insurer combination
constitutes a per se violation of section 1. Likewise, when two or more
insurers agree that a particular underwriting factor shall not be used in
determining the level of premiums, the insurers are taking a factor relevant to
the ultimate cost to the consumer and agreeing to eliminate this factor as a
basis for competition. 56 In other words, when insurers surrender the right to
make price distinctions based upon a particular underwriting factor, insurers

53. ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supranote 43, at 10-11.
54. Id.at 12-13.
55. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 67-68 (1986) (explaining "proliferation of risk classifications in insurance
markets." "Different insurers sometimes may classify in different ways in the hope of
capturing a different slice of the universe of good risks."); COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISSUES AND NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS IN STATE REGULATION OF

THE INSURANCE BUSINESS 102-04 (1979) (describing fierce competition through classification

in automobile insurance). See also Cynthia J. Crosson & Michael L. Albanese, Gap Widens
Between Haves and Have-Nots, 97 BEST'S REV. 63 (1997) (describing conditions of "intense
competition" in life insurance industry); Scott E. Harrington, InsuranceRate Regulationin the
20th Century, 19 J. INS. REG. 204, 211-12 (2000) ("Economists generally agree that market
structure and ease of entry are highly conducive to competition in auto, homeowners, workers'
compensation, and most other property-liability insurance lines.").
56. See Dep't of Justice Response Letter (B.R.L. 92-1) (Jan. 14, 1992) ("an agreement
among competitors regarding the price or terms under which they will underwrite insurance
would raise antitrust concerns.").
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forfeit the ability to segregate a risk class and offer the members of the
subdivided classes a differentiated product based on coverage or price (or
both), all of which has the effect of stabilizing price in the relevant market by
eliminating competition based on a component of product price. This, too,
falls within the category of restraints that courts have traditionally deemedper
se violations of section 1.
Insurers agreeing upon the manner in which insurance premiums will be
calculated is analogous to the arrangement declared a per se violation of
section 1 in In re Wheat Rail FreightRate Antitrust Litigation,57 where
defendant railroads set the manner in which freight would be priced-flat rate
58
or proportional--depending on whether the freight was transit or nontransit.
As the court explained, "the agreement in question did not actually fix prices,
but rather the manner in which those rates/prices are calculated. Nevertheless,
the concept of price fixing which defines per se illegal conduct includes
defendants' conduct., 59 This reasoning would seem to support a conclusion
that insurer collaboration with respect to underwriting factors is per se
unlawful, but one possible basis for distinguishing the restraint in Wheat Rail
Freight from horizontal insurer agreements on underwriting criteria is the
proximity of the restraint to the effect on price. In Wheat Rail Freight,the
court observed that "[t]he agreement among defendants to eliminate the transit
privilege on proportional rate freight has a direct effect on the price of freight.
. . . [A]n agreement on how rates are to be calculated effectively fixes
prices. '' 60 As explained above, if the relationship between the restraint on a
component of price and the ultimate price is sufficiently attenuated, courts
have applied the rule of reason rather than the per se rule in assessing the
restraint. In circumstances where insurers agree not to use a particular
underwriting factor in determining premiums, one might argue that the impact
on price is more attenuated because competition can still occur with respect to
other underwriting factors, thereby diluting the impact on price of the

57. 579 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. I11.1984), affd, 759 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied
sub nom., Little Crow Milling Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 476 U.S. 1158 (1986). Most
price-fixing cases involve direct restraints on price or output (or both). It is less common for
competitors to agree to fix a component of price, although examples of such conduct do exist.
Still less common are agreements among competitors to agree upon a methodology for
determining product price, but Wheat Rail Freight provides an example of this kind of
collaboration. See, e.g., Wheat Rail, 579 F. Supp. at 523.
58. Wheat Rail, 579 F. Supp. at 538.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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agreement not to use one particular factor. This analysis does not validate the
restraint, but it does provide a basis for testing it-and possibly upholding itunder the rule of reason.
If the rule of reason is the appropriate standard, the question becomes
whether the restraint "is one that promotes competition or one that suppresses
competition.'
Exactly how this analysis would play out in the case of
insurer agreements with respect to use of underwriting criteria is difficult to
predict. On the one hand, competition would be enhanced based on the fact
that consumers whose genetic profiles indicate higher risk would have access
to insurance that would otherwise not be available at all or would be available
only at higher rates. But consumers whose genetic profiles do not show
propensity for higher risk or which affirmatively demonstrate a propensity for
lower risk would not be able to receive the advantages of their relatively
advantageous genetic profiles. When these consumers are grouped with
consumers whose risks are higher, competition is impaired. In the same vein,
consumers whose family history puts them in a higher-risk group would not
be able to use genetic information to negate the assumptions normally drawn
from adverse family history; for these consumers, competition is reduced. It is
by no means obvious that the pro-competitive virtues of a restraint on the use
of genetic information in underwriting outweigh the anticompetitive aspects of
the restraint (or vice versa); thus, it cannot be assumed that the restraint would
pass muster under the rule of reason.
Because a restraint on the use of genetic information arguably furthers
egalitarian values and public policies which encourage the equal treatment of
individuals based on factors beyond their control, the question arises as to
whether these justifications count in the restraint's favor under a rule of reason
analysis. As noted earlier, social considerations are generally excluded from
rule of reason analysis. For example, in National Society of Professional
Engineers v. United States,62 the United States Supreme Court rejected the
professional organization's argument that a provision in its canon of ethics
prohibiting competitive bidding by member engineers was necessary to
prevent inferior engineering work and to protect the public's health, welfare,
and safety.6 3 The Court reasoned that its role was "not to decide whether a
policy favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the interest of the

61. Nat'l Soc'y of Pro. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).

62. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
63. Id. at 681.
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members of an industry," 64 because the Sherman Act reflects Congress's
judgment that competition "will produce not only lower prices, but also better
goods and services," 65 and that under the rule of reason, inquiry into "the
question of whether competition is good or bad" is not permitted. 66 Similarly,
in FederalTrade Commission v. IndianaFederationofDentists, 67 the Court
rejected the professional organization's quality of care justifications for a
refusal to provide x-rays to insurance companies. The Court explained:
The argument is, in essence, that an unrestrained market in
which consumers are given access to the information they
believe to be relevant to their choices will lead them to make
unwise and even dangerous choices. Such an argument
amounts to "nothing less than
a frontal assault on the basic
68
policy of the Sherman Act.,
The restraint in ProfessionalEngineers is arguably distinguishable from a
insurer-imposed restraint on use of an underwriting factor in that the
professional association's restraint on competitive bidding is directly
beneficial to the economic self-interest of the association's members, whereas
the insurance restraint does not eliminate competitive bidding but merely
alters the terms on which the insurers' competition for business occurs. The
restraint in Indiana Federation is similarly distinguishable; it, too, bore a
direct relationship to the economic betterment of the dentists imposing the
restraint. If a constraint on the use of genetic information in underwriting has
any economic benefit for insurers, it is highly indirect and much less
significant to the insurers than the restraints in ProfessionalEngineers and
IndianaFederationwere to the parties imposing them.
The economic self-interest factor was important to the Third Circuit's
analysis in United States v. Brown University,69 where an agreement among
universities on the financial aid to be offered students to eliminate a bidding
war among the universities for top applicants was at issue. The universities
argued that the agreements were designed to help make more money available
for needy students, and the district court rejected this justification as an

64. Id. at 692.
65. Id. at 695.
66. Id.
67. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
68. Id. at 463 (quoting Profl Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 695).
69. 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
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inappropriate social, non-economic justification. 70
The Third Circuit
disagreed, reasoning that the aims of the financial aid agreement would
increase the quality of the educational product by increasing socio-economic
diversity on campuses and would increase consumer choice by making highquality education available to different students, unlike the restraint in
ProfessionalEngineerswhich reduced consumer choice. 7' The Third Circuit
remanded the case to the district court for full rule of reason analysis.72
How the choice-enhancing factor that aided the restraint in Brown
University plays out in the insurance context is difficult to assess. On the one
hand, it might be argued that a restraint on use of genetic information in
underwriting increases consumer choice by making insurance available to
more persons. Those who would have been denied insurance or only offered
insurance on limited terms due to negative genetic information are benefited if
insurers cannot take such information into consideration. On the other hand,
applicants who do not present negative genetic information would presumably
be rated as lower-risk insureds and would have access to lower-cost insurance
if insurers did not foreclose their ability to make underwriting distinctions
based on genetic information. How these two factors would be balanced by a
court-and whether, ultimately, the restraint would be determined to achieve a
net pro-competitive effect-is difficult to predict.
Perhaps a more likely outcome is that courts would observe that
prohibiting life insurer use of genetic information in underwriting is
something that the legislatures could do; after all, many state legislatures have
taken precisely that position with respect to health insurance underwriting and
a few have done so with respect to life insurance underwriting.73 The failure
of some legislatures to include life insurance in the statutes prohibiting the use
of genetic information in health insurance underwriting stands, arguably, as an
indirect, but deliberate statement of legislative policy that such a prohibition is
not desired, at least at this time. In some states, the relevant statute has an
explicit carve-out for life insurance.74 In circumstances where legislatures
have declined to elevate egalitarian values with respect to the use of genetic
information in life insurance underwriting, a court may decline to take it upon
itself to elevate such values in the face of legislative unwillingness to do so.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 664.
Id. at 677-78.
Id. at 678.
See supra, note 1.
See Mo. REV. STAT. § 375.1303(3) (2000).
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3. Underwriting Collaboration as a Concerted Refusal to Deal
Courts have also interpreted section 1 as placing limitations on
competitors' ability to agree not to deal with, or to deal only on particular
terms with, other entities.7" These arrangements are typically described as
"group boycotts" or "concerted refusals to deal."' 6 For purposes of the
applicability of the Sherman Act, it is not necessary to distinguish between
boycotts and concerted refusals to deal; "as far as the Sherman Act (outside
the exempted insurance field) is concerned, concerted agreements on contract
terms are as unlawful as boycotts."" Early cases treated these combinations
as per se violations of section 1, but more recent cases tend to analyze such
restraints under the rule of reason. 78 Exactly how one draws the line between
a refusal to deal that is per se unlawful and one that receives rule of reason
treatment is difficult to articulate. Even the United States Supreme Court has
acknowledged this problem with respect to boycotts: 'there is more confusion
about the scope and operation of theper se rule against group boycotts than in
' ' 79
reference to any other aspect of the per se doctrine.
In the insurance context, the argument might be made that an agreement
among insurers to deal with individual applicants only on terms that make no
distinction based on genetic information constitutes a boycott or concerted
refusal to deal. Authority for this position comes from cases like Sandy River
Nursing Carev. Aetna Casualty,8" where the First Circuit held that concerted

75. ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 43, at 104.
76. Id.
77. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 803 (1993). The Court cited Paramount
Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930) and United States v. FirstNatI
Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44 (1930) for the proposition that an agreement among competing
motion picture distributors refusing to license films to exhibitors except on standardized terms
was unlawful, and Anderson v. Shipowners Ass 'n ofPac. Coast, 272 U.S. 359 (1926), which
involved the effort of an association of employers to establish industry-wide employment
terms, as examples of unlawful concerted refusals to deal.
The distinction between concerted refusals and boycotts is, however, highly relevant to the
scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act's antitrust exemption because no protection is given
boycotts. This issue is discussed below.
78. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n. v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); N.W.
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985); ANTITRUST
LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 43, at 105.
79. N.W. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,294
(1985) (quoting LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 83, at 229-

30(1977)).
80. 985 F.2d 1138 (lstCir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 818 (1993).
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efforts by insurers to refuse to offer certain types of insurance coverage in an
attempt to induce the Maine legislature to authorize rate increases was "an
economic boycott that beyond doubt 'constituted a classic restraint of trade
within the meaning of Section one of the Sherman Act"' 8' and was per se
unlawful (although the boycott was ultimately exempted from the antitrust
laws by virtue of the state action doctrine, which is discussed below).
In Sandy River, the concerted action was designed to secure objectives
collateral to the transactions in which the restraint was imposed, which under
the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in HartfordFire, constitutes a
boycott for purposes of section 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 2 An
effort to impose standard terms is, in contrast, a concerted refusal to deal, as it
is difficult to imagine a scenario in which an agreement among life insurers to
abandon the use of genetic information in underwriting would have any
purpose in a collateral transaction. Although this concerted conduct is
unlawful under the Sherman Act, the antitrust exemption provided by the
McCarran-Ferguson Act immunizes it, as discussed more fully below.
4. Underwriting Collaboration as a Uniform Product Standard
Industry self-regulation efforts can also give rise to allegations of
concerted refusal to deal. 3 One of the most common scenarios involves
industry enforcement of trade association membership criteria; if,for example,
an association member deviates from association guidelines, other association
members might take steps to sanction the offending member, perhaps through
actions that exclude the offender from markets.8 4 Association membership
criteria can also be directed at third parties, as, for example, occurs when a
professional organization explicitly seeks to deny third parties (fox example,
an association of physicians creating standards that exclude non-physicians)
privileges that come with association membership. In evaluating whether such
restrictions constitute unlawful concerted action, "courts typically have
examined whether the collective action is intended to accomplish a goal

81. Id.at 1143 (quoting FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 422

(1990)).
82. For more discussion of this aspect of HartfordFire, see text accompanying notes 12025, infra.
83. ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 43 at 114.
84. See, e.g., N.W. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284 (1985).
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justifying self-regulation and, ifso, whether the action is reasonably related to
the goal. ' 5
Industry associations sometimes also set standards for product quality or
safety, occasionally offering certifications for products that meet the
standards.
When a particular firm's product is excluded from or
disadvantaged in the market on account of its failure to meet such standards,
the firm might claim that the association's standards constituted an unlawful
restraint on trade. For example, in Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian
Head, Inc.,86 the petitioner, a manufacturer of steel conduit, lobbied a trade
association to disapprove the use of polyvinyl conduit as an approved type of
electrical conduit. 87 The respondent, a manufacturer of polyvinyl conduit who
was disadvantaged by the association's action, brought an antitrust action
against the respondent and the association under the logic that the action
constituted a concerted refusal to deal, and the United States Supreme Court
upheld the section 1 claim.88 When challenged, such standards are usually
evaluated under the rule of reason:
Key factors determining whether . . . standard-setting or
certification programs restrain trade are the extent of the
economic detriment they cause to an excluded or nonqualifying firm, the breadth of restrictions in relation to their
need, and how the standards are used. In considering the
manner in which standards are used, courts have considered
whether the application of nominally acceptable rules is
designed to suppress competition.8 9
Product standard-setting is common in the insurance industry; most
notable is the practice in many lines of insurance of the creation of
standardized forms. When challenged, courts have noted the pro-competitive
aspects of industry standardization of forms, in that standardization makes

85. Id.
86. 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
87. Id. at 496-97.
88. Id. at 511. See also Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S.
556 (1982) (association held liable for acts of agents where agents used association's safety
standards against plaintiff at urging of one of its competitors); United States v. Am. Bar Ass'n
Proposed Final Judgment & Competitive Impact Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 39,421 (Aug. 2, 1995)
(Department of Justice accepted consent decree that bars ABA from imposing accreditation
requirements or conditions on various aspects of law school faculty compensation, library
standards, etc.).
89. ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 43, at 115-16.
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consumer comparison of the price of alternative products easier. 90 If insurers
were to agree that policy pricing would not be based on certain criteria, it
could be argued that this combination constituted the equivalent of a trade
association standard or perhaps the standardization of the product itself.
Those who could claim disadvantage from the practice would be consumers
who would have benefited if the underwriting criterion had been used (in this
context, consumers lacking genetic characteristics that would have been
disadvantageous in the underwriting process) and, perhaps, firms that wish to
market policies based on genetic distinctions if efforts to exclude these firms
from the market accompanied the promulgation of the standard. The
evaluation of the standard would proceed under the rule of reason, and, it is
difficult to predict what conclusions courts would draw when applying the
rule.
5. Summary
If life insurers were to act collaboratively to set standards for use of
genetic information in insurance underwriting, the practice could be
characterized as unlawful price-fixing in that competition with respect to a
component of product price is being eliminated, as a concerted refusal to deal
with consumers on terms other than the sale of products which are not based
on such underwriting, or as a concerted refusal to deal under the guise of
association standard-setting. There is authority for viewing the fixing of a
component of product price as a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act, although the attenuated connection between the restraint and ultimate
price may mean that the restraint is tested under the rule of reason. The other
contentions are likely to be evaluated under the rule of reason. In the absence
of clear precedent on insurer combinations involving underwriting factors,
particularly combinations involving restraints motivated by pro-egalitarian
values, it is difficult to predict how a court would balance the pro-competitive

90. See, e.g., Maple Flooring Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 566 (1925)
(standardization is beneficial to both industry and consumers); Tag Mfrs. Inst. v. FTC, 174 F.2d
452, 462 (1st Cir. 1949) (concerted efforts to standardize products are beneficial to "all
concerned, including the consumer who, among other benefits, is thereby better enabled to
know what he is buying and to make intelligent price comparisons"); James S. Greenan & John
P. Markin, The Impact of California'sProposition 103 on Insuranceand Related Industries:
Exchange ofInformation, StandardizationofFormsandProducts, andEffect ofJoint Activities
Outside California, 659 PLI/CoRP 639, 648 (1989) (in the absence of concerted action to
mandate use of the standardized form, "the existence of a product standard that may be used by
competitors based upon unilateral choice should not be judged an antitrust violation.").
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and anti-competitive aspects of the restraint. The possibility that the restraint
would be declared unlawful cannot be casually dismissed. At that point, the
analysis would proceed to a further question, the answer to which could moot
all of the Sherman Act analysis: whether the insurer conduct enjoys an
exemption from federal antitrust law. The three possible exemptions-the
McCarran-Ferguson exemption; the state action exemption; and the NoerrPennington exemption-are discussed in the next three subsections.
C. The McCarran-FergusonFederalAntitrust Exemption
1. Origin of the Exemption and Substantive Overview
Although the McCarran-Ferguson Act is often described as a statute
preempting federal antitrust law, the Act does much more than that. The
statute's most important purpose is to give primacy to state regulation of the
insurance business to the extent that the states choose to regulate the industry,
at least to the extent that Congress opts not to reassert its primacy, as it can at
any time or in any specific context. 9 1 Yet because the Act's emergence can be
traced to the concern of stock fire and casualty companies about the
application of antitrust laws to their business, the Act's antitrust implications
are very significant.
Even before the Sherman Act was passed in 1890, it was assumed that the
federal government lacked authority to regulate the insurance industry. Under
the authority of the Supreme Court's 1869 decision in Paul v. Virginia,92 a
policy of insurance was deemed not to be "a transaction of commerce," which
was tantamount to putting the business of insurance outside the constitutional
authority of Congress.93 Under this precedent to which the Court adhered for
seventy-five years,94 individual states retained the authority to regulate
insurance companies.
In 1944, the Supreme Court overruled Paul in United States v. SouthEastern Underwriters Ass'n 95 and held that insurance transactions were

91. See Spencer L. Kimball, The Meaning of the McCarran-FergusonAct Today, 10 J.
INS. REG. 5, 6 (1991) ("[Act] was intended primarily to allocate power in our federal system to

deal with and make law for insurance.").
92. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
93. 1d. at 183.
94. See, e.g., N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495,508 (1913); Hooper
v. Cal., 155 U.S. 648, 655 (1895).
95. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
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subject to federal regulation under the Commerce Clause.96 This also meant
that the insurance industry was subject to federal antitrust statutes. In
response to the SEUA decision, the industry and the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners rallied behind legislation to limit the impact of the
decision, and Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act 97 in 1945.
The SEUA decision arose out of the effort of the Missouri Attorney
General to indict an association of 198 stock fire insurance companies in six
states, its officers, and its member companies for unlawful agreements to fix
insurance rates and boycott nonmembers. It is undoubtedly no coincidence
that Congress began to consider an antitrust exemption for the insurance
industry while the SEUA litigation was pending. 98 In October, 1943, Congress
began hearings on a number of bills that would have provided a total antitrust
exemption for the insurance industry, but this approach, sponsored by stock
fire insurance companies but opposed by the life and mutual companies, did
not garner sufficient support for enactment. Congress then turned to an
alternative proposal backed by the NAIC, and it was this proposal which
became the basis for what was ultimately adopted as the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. The predominant purpose of the NAIC was not to create an antitrust
exemption (which, of course, had been the purpose of the stock fire insurance
companies who were concerned about the SEUA indictments) but was to
preserve the system of state regulation." Thus, it is correct to observe that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act was most importantly a federalism statute, not an
antitrust preemption statute.' 0 0

96. Id. at 579.
97. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2000).
98. This history is summarized in Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440
U.S. 205, 218-25 (1979). For a detailed discussion, see Alan M. Anderson, Insurance and
Antitrust Law: The McCarran-FergusonAct andBeyond, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 81, 83-89
(1983); Charles D. Weller, The McCarran-FergusonAct's AntitrustExemptionfor Insurance:
Language,HistoryandPolicy, 1978 DuKE L.J. 587,592-97 (year); EARL W. KINTNER, ET. AL.,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW: A TREATISE ON THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, § 70.3,
at 184-88 (1994).
99. The Interim Report of the NAIC's Subcommittee on Federal Legislation in 1945
described the NAIC's task as "preserving state regulation and at the same time not
emasculating the federal anti-trust laws." Weller, supranote 98, at 593 (quoting 1945 NAIC
PROC. 156, 159-60). Further, a 1944 report of the Subcommittee specifically recommended "a
limited exemption of insurance from the Sherman and Clayton Acts for cooperative procedures
related to statistics, rates, coverage and similar matters." Id. at 594 (citing 1945 NAIC PROC.
23, 28-29, reprintedin 90 CONG. REC. A4403-05 (1944)).
100. See RoyalDrug, 440 U.S. at 219, n.18:
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The substantive core of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is contained in
section 2:
(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged
therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which
relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate,
impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance... unless such
Act specifically relates to the business of insurance: Provided,
That after June 30, 1948, [the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act,
and the Federal Trade Commission Act] shall be applicable to
the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not
regulated by State law.
Section 2(a) states that the "business of insurance"--a phrase that is not
defined in the Act-is appropriately within the domain of state regulation.
The portion of section 2(b) before the proviso functions as a "reverse
preemption" statute; Congress uses its commerce power to state that no act of
Congress shall preempt state law unless Congress is explicit that it intends
such preemption to occur. Because antitrust laws are general statutes that do
not "specifically relate" to insurance, the antitrust laws would be applied to
the insurance business if the text of section 2(b) ended before the proviso.
The section 2(b) proviso addresses the antitrust question and creates a limited
antitrust exemption: after June 30, 1948, the federal antitrust laws shall apply
to the business of insurance to the extent the states opt not to regulate such
business. The proviso does not explain what kind or intensity of regulation is
necessary to trigger the antitrust exemption; like the "business of insurance"
definition, this matter is left to the courts for development and interpretation.
Section 3(b) of the Act created an exception to the section 2(b) antitrust
exemption. It states that the Sherman Act applies to some insurer activities
regardless of whatever regulation the states might enact: "Nothing contained
in this chapter shall render the said Sherman Act inapplicable to any

There is no question that the primary purpose of the McCarranFerguson Act was to preserve state regulation of the activities of insurance
companies, as it existed before the South-Eastern Underwriters case. ...
The question in the present case, however, is one under the quite different
secondary purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act-to give insurance
companies only a limited exemption from the antitrust laws.
For further discussion, see Weller, supra note 98, at 598; JERRY, supranote 13, § 21 [c], at 77.
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agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or
intimidation." None of the three practices listed in section 3(b) is defined in
the statute. The term "boycott" has been a difficult one in antitrust law, and
coercion and intimidation are concepts that are potentially much broader than
whatever meaning is given to the term "boycott."
When the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act for antitrust
enforcement is digested from the Act's provisions, the following formula
emerges: if a federal antitrust law is sought to be applied to an insurer activity,
the activity--(1) if it constitutes the "business of insurance"--is exempt from
such regulation (2) to the extent that such business "is regulated by" state law
and (3) the challenged insurer activity does not constitute "a boycott, coercion
or intimidation" within the meaning of the section 3(b) exception.' 0' The
three elements of this formula are discussed in the ensuing subsections.
2. The "Business of Insurance"
For many years after the McCarran-Ferguson Act was enacted, it was
widely assumed that federal antitrust law-and state antitrust law as wellhad limited relevance to the activities of insurance companies. 10 2 However,
two United States Supreme Court decisions-Group Life & HealthInsurance
Co. v. Royal Drug Co.' 03 in 1979, and Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v.
Pireno104 in 1982-construed the McCarran-Ferguson Act narrowly, thereby
exposing insurance companies to increased antitrust scrutiny. This narrowing
of the McCarran-Ferguson immunity has continued during the last twenty
years, perhaps reflecting a view that the immunity was initially construed too
broadly, or perhaps that the immunity has become unnecessary in light of the
availability of the state action immunity, which is discussed below.'0 5

101. See, e.g., Uniforce Temp. Personnel, Inc. v. Nat'l Council on Comp. Ins., 87 F.3d

1296, 1299 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts the business of
insurance if it isregulated by state law and does not constitute a boycott); UNR Indus., Inc. v.
Cont'l Ins. Co., 607 F. Supp. 855, 862 (N.D. Ill.
1984) ("The McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts
from the antitrust laws conduct which isthe business of insurance, isregulated by state law, and
does not amount to boycott, coercion or intimidation."). For more discussion, see JERRY, supra
note 13, § 21[d], at 78-96.
102. INSURANCE ANTITRUST HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 1.
103. 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
104. 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
105. See 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 219a, at 325-26
(Rev. 2d ed. 2000); KINTNER ET AL., supra note 98, § 70.6, at 203-05.
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As explained above, the McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts the "business of
insurance" from federal antitrust laws if the challenged activity is regulated by
state law and does not constitute a boycott, coercion, or intimidation within
the meaning of section 3(b) of the Act. Thus, the threshold question is
whether the challenged insurer activity involves the "business of insurance."
If this question is answered in the negative, the insurer conduct enjoys no
protection from antitrust analysis. Under the Royal Drug-Pirenotest, three
questions must be asked and answered in the affirmative when determining
whether an insurer's activity constitutes the "business of insurance:" (1) Does
the activity involve the underwriting or spreading of risk? (2) Does the
activity involve an integral part of the insurer-insured relationship? (3) Is the
activity limited to entities within the insurance industry? 10 6 None of the three
factors is necessarily determinative in and of itself.'0 7
To satisfy the first element, which requires that the activity involve the
underwriting or spreading of risk, the insurer's activity must have "the effect
of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk."' 08 Transactions in which
the insurer does not assume risk and distribute it across a pool of similarly
situated insureds in similar transactions will not meet this test. If, for
example, the insurance product is primarily an investment instrument, such as
a variable life insurance or variable annuity product, the product may not
involve the spreading of risk and thus may not be the business of insurance.
Thus, in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Variable Annuity Life
Insurance Co. of America,'0 9 the Court concluded that the variable annuity
policies offered by insurance companies were not part of the business of
insurance protected by the McCarran-Ferguson Act:
[T]he concept of "insurance" involves some investment risktaking on the part of the company. The risk of mortality,
assumed here, gives these variable annuities an aspect of
insurance. Yet it is apparent, not real; superficial, not
substantial. In hard reality the issuer of a variable annuity that
has no element of a fixed return assumes no true risk in the
insurance sense. It is no answer to say that the risk of
declining returns in times of depression is the reciprocal of the

106. For detailed discussion of Royal Drug and Pireno, see
219b, at 326-41 (2d ed. 2000).
107. Pireno,458 U.S. at 129.
108. Id.
109. 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
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fixed-dollar annuitant's risk of loss of purchasing power when
prices are high and gain of purchasing power when they are
low. We deal with a more conventional concept of riskbearing when we speak of "insurance." For in common
understanding "insurance" involves a guarantee that at least
some fraction of the benefits will be payable in fixed
amounts. 1 0
The underlying public policy advanced by the Court's decision is causing
variable annuities sold by insurance companies to be subject to the regulatory
scheme of the securities laws."' The logic of this policy is as follows: If the
insurance company's instrument is the functional equivalent of the financial
instruments sold by non-insurers, it is not unique to the insurance business and
insurance company activities with regard to it should not enjoy special status
as "business of insurance" under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. By this
analysis, inter-insurer agreements with respect to these kinds of insurance
products should have no immunity from federal antitrust laws.
The second part of the Royal Drug-Pirenotest-whether the activity
involves an integral part of the insurer-insured relationship-was derived from
Securities andExchange Commission v. NationalSecurities,Inc.,"I 2 where the
Court stated that section 2(b) was designed to protect from impairment,
invalidation, or preemption by congressional action state laws concerned with
the relationship between the insurance company and its policyholders:
Congress was concerned with the type of state regulation that
centers around the contract of insurance .... The relationship
between insurer and insured, the type of policy which could be
issued, its reliability, interpretation, and enforcement-these
were the core of the "business of insurance." Undoubtedly,
other activities of insurance companies relate so closely to their
status as reliable insurers that they too must be placed in the
same class. But whatever the exact scope of the statutory term,
it is clear where the focus was-it was on the relationship
between the insurance company and the policyholder. Statutes

110. Id.at 71.
111. See JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, COSTLY POLICIES: STATE
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST EXEMPTION IN INSURANCE MARKETS 17-18 (1993).

112. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
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aimed at protecting or regulating this relationship, directly or
indirectly, are laws regulating the "business of insurance. 113
Royal Drug refined the foregoing analysis somewhat, as it can be argued that
"every business decision made by an insurance company has some impact on
its reliability, its ratemaking, and its status as a reliable insurer. 1 14 Thus, if
the insurer's activity has only an "indirect" effect on the reliability of the
insurer or on the insurer-insured relationship, that minimal effect is not
enough to qualify the activity as the "business of insurance."1'15
To satisfy the third part of the test, it is necessary to show that the
challenged insurer activity is limited to entities within the insurance industry.
The Court in Royal Drug looked to the legislative history of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act and observed that, "the primary concern of both
representatives of the insurance industry and the Congress was that
cooperative ratemaking efforts be exempt from the antitrust laws. 1 16 Given
that purpose, the Court reasoned that the exemption did not extend to activities
involving parties outside the insurance industry.117
Under the tripartite test, it is well settled that rate-making activity
constitutes the business of insurance for purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. 18 Scope of coverage, including the content of policy provisions, is very
closely connected to rate-making; thus, joint activities with respect to scope of
coverage also fit within the business of insurance. As one court explained,
"[m]atters of rate, extent of coverage, and policy provisions go to the very
heart of the relationship between the insurance company and the policyholder
and therefore clearly fall within the National Securities definition of the
business of insurance."' 19

113. Id. at 460.
114. Grp. Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 216-17 (1979).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 221.
117. Id. at 231.
118. Id. at 224-25 n.32 ("the fixing of rates is the 'business of insurance'). See also
Uniforce Temp. Pers., Inc., supra note 101, at 1300 ("appellees' rate-making activity clearly
constitutes the business of insurance for purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act"); KINTNER ET
AL., supra note 98, § 70.7, at 213 ("It is clear that agreements among insurance companies as to
their rates are within the 'business of insurance."').
119. Mcllhenny v. Am. Title Ins. Co., 418 F. Supp. 364, 369 (E.D. Pa. 1976). As another
court explained, "[iut is obvious that an agreement to change the type of policy offered is the
business of insurance. The type of coverage offered directly affects the spreading of risk, is at
the very heart of the policy relationship, and the agreement is limited to insurance companies."
UNR Indus. v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 607 F. Supp. 855, 862 (N.D. I11.1984). See also Ocean State
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This is consistent with the Supreme Court's analysis in HartfordFire
Insurance Co. v. California,120 where the Court reaffirmed the tripartite test
articulated in Royal Drugand Pirenowhen evaluating United States insurers'
joint actions to standardize policy forms.12' The Ninth Circuit did not hold, as
the Supreme Court observed, that the domestic insurers' conduct with respect
to standardization of forms fell outside the business of insurance, and the
Supreme Court said nothing to call this conclusion into doubt. 122 It is unlikely
that the Court would have let the Ninth Circuit's analysis pass without
comment if the Court thought it erroneous. The holding in HartfordFire
concerned whether domestic insurers lost their antitrust exemption when they
acted in concert with foreign reinsurers (the Supreme Court concluded that
they did not), 23 but under the reasoning of Hartford Fire, joint insurer
standard setting with respect to the terms of coverage and prices is squarely
within the "business of insurance. 124 Although joint insurer conduct with
respect to underwriting criteria has not been directly challenged or the subject

Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 883 F.2d 1101, 1108(lst Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990) (the marketing and pricing of insurance policies is
the business of insurance).
120. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
121. Id.at780-81.
122. Id. at 782. The Court referenced the joint insurer conduct in footnote ten, where it
observed that while it "might be tempting to think that unlawful acts are implicitly excluded
from the 'business of insurance,"' such analysis would not conform to the text of § 2(b) of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, which contemplates that illegal acts, i.e., acts that violate the Sherman
Act, may still enjoy antitrust immunity. Id. at n.10.
123. The Ninth Circuit held that the McCarran-Ferguson exemption was lost because
foreign reinsurers, which the circuit court found not subject to state regulation and therefore not
exempt under the McCarran Act, had participated in the activities. In re Ins. Antitrust Litig.,
938 F.2d 919, 928 (9th Cir. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in parton other grounds sub nom,
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764 (1993). The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that
even if the foreign reinsurers were non-exempt (an issue the Court did not decide), their
participation with the domestic insurers was still part of the "business of insurance" and did not
eliminate the domestic insurers' antitrust immunity. HartfordFire,509 U.S. at 784.
124. A more recent decision dealing with claims practices also upheld the McCarranFerguson immunity. In United States Dep't of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491 (1993), the
Court held that an Ohio statute granting policyholders' claims priority over claims of the
federal government in proceedings to liquidate an insurance company escaped preemption
because it regulated the business of insurance. Id. at 505. The pattern of the Supreme Court
cases is that activities within the traditionally understood business of insurance-ratemaking;
standardization of forms; claims processing; etc.--enjoy the protection of the McCarranFerguson Act.
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of ajudicial decision, 125 the logic of the foregoing cases would surely consider
such agreements to fall within the ambit of the "business of insurance." If this
is correct, it follows that an agreement by life insurers not to use genetic
information as an underwriting factor would rest at the core of the "business
of insurance." If, however, the insurance product in question did not involve
the transfer of risk (as in the case, for example, of an investment instrument),
the agreement on underwriting criteria would fall outside the "business of
insurance."
3. "Regulated by State Law"
When the statute sought to be applied to an insurer's activity is a federal
antitrust law, the analysis becomes more complicated because of the section
2(b) proviso, which requires that the insurer activity be "regulated by State
Law" to prevent the application of federal law. The difficulty with this
language is its ambiguity with respect to what kind of regulation is needed and
the extent to which the regulation must be effective to avoid the regulation of
federal antitrust law. In applying this language, courts have been disposed to
treat statutes of general applicability, such as corporation codes, 126 general

125. In Owens v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 654 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,454 U.S.
1092 (1981), an insurance broker brought an action in which he alleged that multiple insurers
and some individuals conspired to give a particular insurer a monopoly in the medical
malpractice field, engaged in an unlawful boycott, and conspired to drive the plaintiff out of
business. Id. at 220-21. In the course of explaining the "business of insurance" exemption, the
court stated that "it is clear that at least the following activities are the business of insurance,
either because they pertain to risk-spreading or to the contract between the insurer and insured,"
and one of the four activities listed was "deciding upon rating classification differences
between individual policies and group marketing plans, either individually or jointly through a
rating bureau. .. ." Id. at 225-26. Joint determination of the factors to be used for pricing
individual policies differently from group policies is functionally the equivalent of joint
determination of underwriting criteria. The quoted passage from Owens is dicta because that
practice was not at issue in the case, but the analysis is consistent with the results in other cases.
As one prominent treatise states with citation to supporting authority, "[a] number of other
essentially horizontal arrangements among insurance companies, which affect the scope or
amount of coverage afforded to an insured, or which indirectly affect the premium paid by the
insured, have also been held within the 'business of insurance."' KINTNER ET AL., supranote 98,
§ 70.7, at 213.
126. Manasen v. Cal. Dental Serv., 424 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds, 638 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1979) (in suit by dentists against corporation providing
prepaid dental plans, state antitrust law, corporation code and business and professions code are
sufficient to constitute state regulation of business of insurance).
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business and professional codes,' 2 7 and state antitrust laws,' 28 as the kinds of
laws that regulate the business of insurance. It is assumed that state
legislatures made a judgment when the general statutes were enacted about the
extent to which insurers should be regulated. When general statutes are
deemed sufficient to meet the state regulation requirement, challenged insurer
activity becomes immune from federal regulation without the state taking
definite steps targeted at the insurer-insured relationship. As for the
effectiveness of state regulation, for the most part, courts have not been
particularly concerned about how much regulation occurs when seeking to
justify recognition of the antitrust exemption. As one treatise states, "[tihe
courts have generally been satisfied with the existence of a state regulatory
scheme and rather superficial indicators of supervision, without much regard
for the actual intensity of state regulation."' 129 This result strikes some
observers as being rather odd, as "it is likely that Congress intended the
antitrust exemption to be available only when effective state regulation, rather
than a mere pretense of regulation, exists.' 130 The generally lax approach of
the courts with respect to the McCarran-Ferguson exemption is more lenient

127. See, e.g., Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc., supra note 119, at 1108-09
(marketing and pricing of health insurance was regulated by state law where state department of
business regulation approved the activities); Manasen, supra note 126, at 657 (in suit by
dentists against corporation providing prepaid dental plans, state antitrust law, corporation
code, and business and professions code are sufficient to constitute state regulation of business
of insurance).
128. See, e.g., Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass'n v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276,
1287 (9th Cir.) (state antitrust laws meet state regulation requirement), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
822 (1983); State v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, 620 F.Supp. 907, 920-21 (D. Md. 1985)
(Maryland's antitrust laws are sufficient to met the state regulation requirement).
129. 1PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 219c, at 342 (Rev. 2d
ed. 2000). See generally ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supranote 43, at 1373. See also 1
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 219c, at 341-42 (Rev. 2d ed.
2000) ("Except in a few non-antitrust decisions, the courts have not scrutinized the nature and
intensity of state regulation very closely."). See, e.g., Uniforce Temp. Pers., Inc. v. Nat'l
Council on Comp. Ins., 892 F. Supp. 1503 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (state regulation prong of test for
business of insurance met if state regulatory agency has jurisdiction generally over the
challenged practices and maintains authority to approve or prohibit them), aff'd, 87 F.3d 1296
(11 th Cir. 1996). But see McIlhenny, supranote 119, at 370-71 ("The McCarran-Ferguson Act
does not require an examination into the regulatory status of every detail of the business of
insurance; it is sufficient that the state regulatory scheme is comprehensive and meaningfully
administered.").

130.

JERRY,

supra note 13, § 21[d][4], at 91-93.
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than the "active supervision" requirement needed for an exemption under the
Parkerdoctrine, discussed below.' 3 '
The leading Supreme Court decision on this issue is Federal Trade
Commission v. National Casualty Co.,132 a 1958 decision in which the Court
rejected the FTC's argument that the states' uniform unfair insurance practices
statutes were insufficient to support application of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act exemption. 133 The FTC argued that the state statutes had not been
effectively elaborated or applied, but the Court essentially took the position
that once a statute purporting to regulate insurance practices has been enacted,
the effectiveness of state regulation is irrelevant.' 34 The Court did note that
the FTC had not argued that the state unfair practices acts "were mere
pretense,"' 135 thereby leaving open the possibility that a sham regulatory
scheme would not be sufficient to create antitrust immunity. Exactly where
this leaves the issue is uncertain.
NationalCasualty also left open the question of whether state regulation
could be ineffective because of constitutional constraints on the extraterritorial
effect of state regulation. This issue was addressed in Federal Trade
Commission v. TravelersHealthAss 'n, 36 which involved the FTC's effort to
prohibit an insurer's nationwide distribution of allegedly deceptive
circulars. 137 The Eighth Circuit upheld the insurer's state action exemption
claim on the basis of a Nebraska statute regulating deceptive insurance
practices. 3 The Supreme Court held that "the state regulation which
Congress provided should operate to displace [federal antitrust law] means
regulation by the State in which the [insurer activity] is practiced and has its
impact."' 139 This means that regulation by a particular state "cannot
provide an
140
exemption for insurer activity occurring beyond its borders."'
Is concerted insurer activity with respect to the use of underwriting
criteria, and with respect to criteria on the use of genetic information in

131.
132.
133.
134.

See infra text accompanying note 159.
357 U.S. 560 (1958) (per curiam).
Id. at 560-65.
Id. at 564-65.

135. Id. at 564.
136. 362 U.S. 293 (1960).
137. Id. at 298-99.
138. See Travelers Health Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 262 F.2d 241,244 (8th Cir. 1959),
vacatedand remanded, 362 U.S. 293 (1960).
139. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293,298-99 (1960).
140. Anderson, supra note 98, at 103.
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particular, "regulated by state law"? No state statute gives explicit approval to
such restrictions. At least forty-five states regulate some aspect of genetic
testing in health insurance, and many of these statutes restrict insurers'
underwriting practices. A few states extend these prohibitions to life
insurance underwriting.' 4 1 The fact that legislatures in many states opted not
to regulate underwriting in life insurance at the same time they enacted such
regulations in health insurance suggests that the states made a judgment about
the extent to which regulation of underwriting with respect to genetic
information should occur.
In addition, the unfair trade practices statutes of most states contain unfair
discrimination prohibitions that specifically reference sex, marital status, race,
religion, and national origin. 142 The omission of genetic characteristics (other
than sex and race) from this list could be viewed as a deliberate legislative
assumption that insurers should not be subject to regulation with respect to
their use of information relevant to such characteristics. The unfair trade
practices statutes have generally not been held to prohibit underwriting criteria
that are "actuarially fair,"' 143 and sex and marital status often figure

141. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISsIONERS, supra note 1.
142. See Model Unfair TradePracticesAct, in 5 NAT'L Assoc. OF INS. COMM'RS, MODEL
LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND GUIDELINES, § 4(G)(5), at 880-84 (2001) (prohibiting "[r]efusing to
insure, refusing to continue to insure, or limiting the amount of coverage available to an
individual because of the sex, marital status, race, religion or national origin of the individual").
Note that by its literal terms, the model act does not reach the level of premium charged for
particular classifications. Generally speaking, distinctions based on sex (and presumably other
listed factors) are not deemed "unfair" if they are based on "actuarially sound" classifications.
See, e.g., State Dept. of Ins. v. Ins. Serv. Office, 434 So.2d 908, 912-13 (Fla.App. 1983)
(Unfair Trade Practices law only prohibits unfair discrimination, not actuarially sound
discrimination); Ins. Serv. Office v. Comm'r of Ins., 381 So.2d 515, 517 (La.App. 1979)
(statute requires that classifications be reasonable and not unfairly discriminatory). See also
Nat'l Org. for Women v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 516 N.Y.S.2d 934, 936 (1987) (Human Rights
Law does not prohibit gender classifications with regard to the terms and conditions of life and
disability insurance policies in insurance).
143. See Roberta B. Meyer, Justificationfor Permitting Life Insurers to Continue to
Underwriteon the Basis of Genetic Information and Genetic Test Results, 27 SUFFOLK U. L.
REv. 1271, 1286 (1993) ("courts have interpreted their own state unfair discrimination statutes
as permitting insurers to distinguish among applicants in underwriting on the basis of any
characteristic that places the insured at a greater hazard for illness or a lower life expectancy,
provided insurers do so fairly"); Joseph M. Miller, Comment, Genetic Testing andInsurance
Classification:NationalActionCan PreventDiscriminationBased on the "Luck ofthe Genetic
Draw,"93 DICK. L. REv. 729, 749 (1989) (courts have interpreted state unfair discrimination
statutes as permitting insurance companies to "use any trait to differentiate among insureds as
long as there is a reasonable basis for concluding that the trait places the insured at a greater
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prominently in underwriting in some lines of insurance in many states.
Although one might argue that this demonstrates that the use of genetic
information in underwriting is not regulated by state law, courts' disposition
to treat statutes of general applicability as the kinds of laws that regulate the
business of insurance strongly suggests that the unfair trade practices statutes
are specific enough to satisfy the "regulated by State law" requirement,
thereby supporting the proposition that insurer underwriting practices with
respect to genetic information do enjoy an antitrust exemption.
The territoriality question could serve in some situations to limit the scope
of the exemption. Assuming an insurer activity which operates and has its
impact nationally, under the authority of Travelers Health, discussed above,
effective regulation of the activity in state A does not provide an exemption
for the activity's operation and impact in state B; only if state B also regulates
the activity does it enjoy the benefit of an exemption in state B. 144 All states
have unfair trade practice regulation, but not all states have genetic
information underwriting regulation. To the extent the exemption's existence
depends on genetic information regulation, it is possible that a national
business practice could enjoy the exemption in some states but not in others.
In short, what constitutes being "regulated by state law" for purposes of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption from federal antitrust law is indefinite.
Because general state statutes have been deemed sufficient to create an
antitrust exemption in other contexts, the best prediction is that courts would
hold that the subject of underwriting with respect to genetic information is
subject to state regulation and therefore enjoys an exemption from antitrust
scrutiny. As one court stated, "[ilt is not necessary to point to a state statute
which gives express approval to a particular practice; rather, it is sufficient
that a state regulatory scheme possess jurisdiction over the challenged
practice."'' 45 If, however, a court opted to require more specific evidence of
state regulation, it is possible that the exemption would be nonexistent in some
jurisdictions.

hazard for illness or a lower life expectancy"); Leah Wortham, The Economics of Insurance
Classification:The Sound ofOne Invisible Hand Clapping,47 OHIO ST. L. J. 835, 851 (1986)
("Such unfair discrimination statutes have been construed only to require that there be a
statistical difference in the average loss between groups for any classification used.").
144. See KINTNER ET AL., supra note 98, at § 70.12, at 235-37.
145. Feinstein v. Nettleship Co. of L.A., 714 F.2d 928, 933 (9th Cir. 1983).
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4. The "Boycott" Exception to the Exemption
If one seeks to subject an insurer's activity to Sherman Act scrutiny, the
Sherman Act will apply-even if the insurer's activity constitutes the
"business of insurance" and even if state law regulates it-if the activity
involves a boycott, coercion, or intimidation. The McCarran-Ferguson Act
provides that nothing in the Act "shall render the . . . Sherman Act
inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or any act of
boycott, coercion, or intimidation.' 46
The Supreme Court has spoken to the content of section 3(b) on two
occasions. In 1978, the Court decided St. PaulFire& Marine Insurance Co.
v. Barry,147 which addressed a conflict in the circuits as to whether section
3(b) was limited to boycotts or concerted activity directed against competing
insurers or agents, or whether the boycott or concerted activity could apply to
conduct directed against policyholders as well. In Barry,physicians sued four
malpractice insurers, three of which allegedly agreed not to offer insurance on
any terms to customers or former customers of the fourth insurer. 48 The
Court rejected defendants' argument that the exemption only extends to
activities intended to coerce competitors rather than policyholders and held
that the boycott exception extends to insurer activities affecting parties outside
the industry. 149 That holding broadened the exception to the exemption, which
had the effect of narrowing the antitrust exemption. The case also did not
resolve the meaning of "boycott," but the Court did reject the suggestion that
either a "boycott" or "coercion" within
price fixing standing alone constitutes
150
the meaning of section 3(b).
In 1993, the Court again examined the meaning of "boycott" in section
3(b) in HartfordFireInsuranceCo. v. California,'5 1 a case in which nineteen
states and numerous private parties brought antitrust suits against domestic
insurers, domestic and foreign reinsurers, and insurance brokers on account of

146. 15U.S.C.§ 1013(b)(2000).
147. 438 U.S. 531 (1978).
148. Id. at 531.

149. Id. at 550, 552. The decision in Barry did not consider the meaning of"coercion" and
"intimidation," the two other key terms in section 3(b). Id. at 541 n. 10.
150. Id. at 544. See also Slagle v. ITT Hartford, 102 F.3d 494 (11th Cir. 1996) (alleged
concerted refusal of insurers to issue windstorm insurance on the open market in certain Florida
coastal areas and to refer such business to ajoint underwriting association whose premiums the
insurers set constituted the business of insurance to which the McCarran-Ferguson antitrust
immunity extended).
151. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
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their alleged agreement to boycott general liability insurers that used
non-conforming policy forms. 5 2 The insurers urged the McCarran-Ferguson
Act exemption, and the question was whether the agreements among primary
insurers and reinsurers on standardized policy forms and terms of coverage
constituted agreements to boycott. 53 The Ninth Circuit applied a broad
definition of boycott, defining it as any "use of economic power of a third
party to force the boycott victim to agree to the boycott beneficiary's
terms.' 54 A majority of the Court rejected this standard, concluding instead
that a boycott exists only when the refusal to deal goes beyond the targeted
transaction. 5 5 For example, a labor strike where the union refuses to work
unless the employer agrees to employment terms is not a boycott, but would
become a boycott if the union members agreed not to purchase the employer's
product until agreement is reached on employment terms. 15 6 Thus, a collective
refusal by the defendant insurers to reinsure risks on the disfavored policy
forms until desired changes were made was not a boycott. 157 Stated more
generally, it is not a boycott for insurers to refuse to engage in a particular
transaction until the coverage or other terms of that transaction are
agreeable.' 58
In light of the Supreme Court's narrow construction of the term "boycott"
in HartfordFire,it is clear that if insurers agree to use particular underwriting
criteria and do not use this agreement to try to extract favorable terms from
third parties on collateral transactions, a section 3(b) boycott is not involved
and the exception to the antitrust exemption is not triggered. Under this logic,

152. Id. at 770-71.
153. Id. at 779 n. 8.
154. In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919,930 (9th Cir. 1991), affd inpart andrev 'din
part on other grounds sub nom, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
155. HartfordIns.Co., 509 U.S. at 802-03. The Court unanimously agreed that "only those
refusals to deal involving the coordinated action of multiple actors constitute section 3(b)
boycotts," Id. at 785, and that a section 3(b) boycott need not involve an "absolute refusal to
deal," but could instead be conditional. Id. at 785-86.
156. Id. at 805.
157. Id. at 806.
158. See id. at 806 ("it is obviously not a 'boycott' for the reinsurers to 'refus[e] to reinsure
coverages written on the ISO CGL forms until the desired changes were made,'... because the
terms of the primary coverages are central elements of the reinsurance contract-they are what
is reinsured."(emphasis in original)). See also Uniforce Temp. Pers., Inc., supranote 101, at
1300 (conduct does not constitute a boycott unless there is a "refusal to deal" in order to coerce
a desired transaction); N.J. Auto. Ins. Plan v. Sciarra, 103 F. Supp. 2d 388, 407 (D.N.J. 1998)
("refusal to deal except on certain terms" does not constitute a boycott).
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if the insurers are entering into this agreement without any effort to extract
concessions on other collateral matters, it is difficult to imagine how such
conduct would fall within the ambit of "coercion" or "intimidation," two other
terms in section 3(b) which to date have received no definitive interpretation
in judicial decisions. Thus, it seems likely that a multi-insurer agreement not
to use particular information in underwriting would not involve a Section 3(b)
boycott, thereby triggering the exception to the antitrust exemption.
5. Summary
If life insurers were to agree to place a moratorium on the use of genetic
information in underwriting, such an agreement would almost certainly be
considered the "business of insurance" unless the policies in question did not
involve risk spreading (i.e., were investment vehicles), in which case the
agreement would be outside the "business of insurance." It is probable that
the activity would be considered a part of business "regulated by State law"
and it is very probable that the activity would not fall within the boycott
exception to the exemption. Thus, a multi-insurer agreement not to use such
information in underwriting would probably enjoy an exemption from federal
antitrust laws under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, except with respect to
insurance products that fall within the category of investment vehicles and
thus fall outside the "business of insurance."
D. The State Action Exemption (the "ParkerDoctrine")
Under the state action doctrine, restraints of trade that are the product of
state regulatory policy are exempt from the antitrust laws. Sometimes called
the "Parkerdoctrine" after the United States Supreme Court decision that is
its cornerstone, 159 antitrust immunity is given to private parties as long as their
conduct is authorized and regulated by the state. It is not enough for the state

159. In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), the Court upheld a California program
regulating production and marketing of raisins by the state's growers. The program was
created by statute and was implemented by an advisory commission on which the state director
of agriculture participated. The statute authorized programs that restricted competition among
growers and maintained prices in the distribution of agricultural commodities to packers. The
Court explained that this program was an "act of government which the Sherman Act did not
undertake to prohibit" Id. at 352. Parker'sroots lie in older cases sustaining state ownership
and operation of business, state control of entry requirements through licensing, and state
regulation of markets against Sherman Act attack. Milton Handler, The CurrentAttack on the
Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, in 1 ANTITRUST IN TRANsInON 201, 208-09 (M.
Handler, ed. 1991). For further discussion of Parker,see 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMp, ANTITRUST LAW 1 22 1b, at 359-62 (Rev. 2d ed. 2000).
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to immunize private conduct that would otherwise be unlawful, as would be
the case if the state simply authorized private actors to fix prices; rather, the
state must be involved so that the competitive
restraints constitute "state action
160
or official action directed by a state."'
The test for determining the availability of the exemption has two
elements: "First, the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed as state policy'; second, the policy must be 'actively
supervised' by the State itself.' 16 ' The "clear articulation" prong is met if the
state clearly intends through the enactment of a regulatory scheme to displace
competition in a particular market. 62 "Specific detailed legislative
authorization" of the restraint of trade is not required, 163 and it is only
necessary that the statute permit, as opposed to require, the anticompetitive
conduct.1 64 The "active supervision" prong is met if state regulators have the
statutory authority to review the challenged anticompetitive conduct and
actually exercise that authority.165 Exactly how vigorous state review must be
to create the state action immunity is uncertain. In FederalTrade Commission
v. Ticor Title Co.,166 the Supreme Court found the active supervision test was
not met where statutory review authority over rate filings existed, and the
insurance department was "staffed and funded" and showed "some basic level
of activity" in enforcing the rating law. 67 This fell short of demonstrating that
"the State has exercised sufficient independent judgment and control so that
the details of the [conduct] have been established as a product of deliberate
state intervention." 168 Thus, more aggressive state regulation is needed to
create Parkerimmunity than is needed for McCarran-Ferguson Act immunity,
but existing case law does not quantify this difference.' 69 The difference

160. Parker,317 U.S. at 351. For more discussion, see 1 PHLLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMp, ANTiTRUST LAW 222a, at 387-88 (Rev. 2d ed. 2000).
161. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980)
(citations omitted).
162. S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 60-61, 64 (1985).
163. Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 415 (1978).
164. See Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 372-73 (1991).
165. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 634 (1992); Patrick v.
Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988).
166. 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
167. Id. at 637-39.
168. Id. at 634 (alteration in original).
169. For more discussion, see Phil Goodin, Note, Keeping the Foxes From Guarding the
Henhouse: The Effect ofHumana v. Forsyth on McCarran-Ferguson's Antitrust Exemptionfor
the Business ofInsurance, 86 IOWA L. REv. 979, 984-85 (200 1).
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between the two regimes is largely academic, as it is difficult to imagine a
situation where the Parkerdoctrine would confer immunity in circumstances
where the insurer activity is insufficiently
regulated by state law to obtain the
1 70
McCarran-Ferguson immunity.
Nevertheless, in those few states that presently limit life insurers' use of
genetic information in underwriting, 171 an agreement among insurers not to
use such information would be immune from antitrust liability under the
Parker doctrine. Whatever anticompetitive impact would arise from such a
restraint would be absolutely irrelevant under antitrust law by virtue of the
state action doctrine. Likewise, if similar statutes were to be adopted in other
states, insurers in those states would be absolutely immune from antitrust
liability. As noted above, many more states have statutes that prohibit the use
72
of genetic information in the underwriting of health insurance policies.
These statutes should not be viewed as constituting state action that
immunizes collaborative conduct by life insurers with respect to genetic
information. The enactment of a health insurance regulation does not carry a
clearly stated legislative purpose to authorize the anticompetitive conduct in
life insurance and does not put in place state mechanisms that supervise
private conduct in this area.
To summarize, the state action doctrine does not immunize life insurers
from antitrust liability for joint agreements to forego using genetic information
in underwriting, except in those states where the use of such information is
prohibited by state statute. The fact remains, however, that by exercising their
prerogative to regulate and supervise insurers' use of genetic information in
life insurance, the states could create federal antitrust immunity under the state
action doctrine. If a few states enacted such legislation and life insurers,
acting independently, conformed their underwriting practices to the
requirements of these states, this conduct should not be deemed an unlawful
combination triggering antitrust scrutiny."'

170. KINTNER ET AL., supra note 98, § 70.13, at 249.
171. See supra note 1.
172. With respect to health insurance policies provided by employers as fringe benefits, the
requirements of the state statutes are preempted by ERISA. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 100101 a (1994). This gap is substantially filled with respect to genetic information, however, by the
Health Insurance Portability and Accessibility Act of 1996, which prohibits group health
insurers from making underwriting distinctions based on "genetic status." Pub. L. No. 104-191,
§702(a)(l)(F), 110 Stat. 1936, 1945 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.).
173. On the one hand, there is the general principle that a state cannot regulate activity
outside its borders. See text accompanying AREEDA, supra note 160, at 146, from which it
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E. The Noerr-PenningtonDoctrine
The Noerr-Penningtondoctrine, which is named for two United States
174
Supreme Court decisions that articulate the doctrine's substantive core,
gives antitrust immunity to restraints that derive from legislative, executive,
regulatory, or judicial decisions resulting from the joint lobbying or litigation
efforts of competitors. The protected conduct is the petitioning of the
government to restrict competition in the marketplace. 175 Standard-setting by
a private association is not protected by this doctrine; rather, the restraint must
flow from government action. 176 Thus, life insurers would be free to
collaborate to petition state legislatures to adopt statutes that would eliminate
underwriting based on genetic factors. Noerr-Penningtonwould not protect
an agreement among life insurers to stop using genetic information in
underwriting.
Under existing authority, it is doubtful that joint insurer lobbying of the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) would be protected
by the Noerr-Penningtonexemption, even though the NAIC is a voluntary
body of government regulators, the efforts of which are often translated

arguably follows that regulation in one state cannot create immunity in another state that lacks
such regulation. But, although few cases have discussed the extraterritorial reach of Parker
immunity, the logic of the doctrine seems to dictate that the exemption "must be coextensive
with the scope of the Sherman Act, and thus [apply] to the interstate effects of a particular form
of state action." Caribe Trailer Sys. v. P.R. Mar. Shipping Auth., 475 F. Supp. 711, 723 (D.C.
Dist. Ct. 1979). In Caribe Trailer, the actions of a Puerto Rican government agency in
acquiring and operating steamships were protected by the state action exemption, even though
this extended the exemption to state control of shipping lines operating outside the territory of
Puerto Rico. The court noted that Parkerv. Brown itself involved action by the State of
California "to raise and stabilize the price of raisins, ninety-five percent of which were sold
outside the state." Id.(citing Parker,317 U.S. at 345).
174. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); E.R.R. Presidents
Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
175. See 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 201-202d, at
148-64 (Rev. 2d ed. 2000).
176. See Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358,376 (7th
Cir. 1987):
If the injury is caused by persuading the government, then the antitrust
laws do not apply to the squelching (Parkerv. Brown) or the persuasion
(Noerr-Pennington). If the injury flows directly from the "petitioning"--if
the injury occurs no matter how the government responds to the request for
aid-then we have an antitrust case. When private parties help themselves to
a reduction in competition, the antitrust laws apply.
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directly into official state policy throughout the nation. 177 In Preferred
Physicians Mutual Risk Retention Group v. Cuomo, 178 the court rejected
insurers' claim of immunity, reasoning that Noerr-Penningtondoes not apply
because the NAIC is not a governmental body: "[the NAIC] is a private trade
association composed of government regulators from different states, and
179
Noerr-Penningtonimmunity does not apply to such private associations.'
Because the Noerr-Penningtonimmunity is grounded in a First Amendment
right to petition the government, the fact that the NAIC is not a government
entity-even though its membership consists of government officials-means
that non-recognition of the immunity for efforts to petition the NAIC is sound
doctrinally. As a matter of antitrust policy, however, it is not obvious that the
Noerr-Penningtonissue was decided correctly in PreferredPhysicians. The
leading Supreme Court authority on the question, upon which the court in
PreferredPhysiciansrelied, involved a very different trade organization and
overtly anticompetitive conduct,180 which would not be the situation with
respect to collaborative insurer conduct with respect to underwriting factors.
Even so, in the absence of clear case law endorsing multi-insurer collaboration
to lobby the NAIC, one should not expect insurers to voluntarily test the limits
of the immunity by engaging in such conduct. But Noerr-Penningtonwould
apply if insurers collaborated to petition state legislators or insurance
commissioners for a statute or rule authorizing industry-wide disregard of
particular underwriting factors.
III. THE STATE ANTITRUST LAWS AND ANTICOMPETITIVE INSURER
CONDUCT

Generally speaking, state antitrust laws use language that tracks closely
the federal statutes, and state courts give federal cases varying degrees of
precedential value, but there are notable deviations from both propositions.' 8'

177. See NAT'L Assoc. OF INS. COMM'RS 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, available at
http://www.naic.org/pressroom/2001 AnnualReportX.pdf (last visited March 1, 2003), at 3.
178. 865 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), vacatedon other grounds,Preferred Physicians
Mut. Risk Retention Group v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1996).
179. Id. at 1072.
180. In Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, 486 U.S. 492 (1988), petitioner
unsuccessfully urged that its efforts to affect a trade association's product standard-setting
process were immune from antitrust liability. In that case, however, the petitioner recruited and
orchestrated a vote at an annual meeting to approve a trade standard (one widely adopted
verbatim in city codes) that would disadvantage the product of its competitors.
181. 14 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 2410, at 302-03 (1999).
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According to one recent compilation, forty-eight of the fifty states have
general antitrust statutes, and many states have "little FTC" acts that generally
operate in the same way as the federal statute. 182 Twelve states have statutory
provisions specifically exempting some insurance-related activities.' 83 Several
states have statutes that incorporate federal exemptions, most notably the
84
McCarran-Ferguson exemption and the state action doctrine, into state law.1
But many states have no such exemption and some generally refuse to find
any immunity for insurance companies from state antitrust law.' 85 Twentyone states have a generic exemption for regulated industries, including
insurers; these exemptions are usually functional equivalents of the state
action doctrine. 186 In a number of states without statutory exemptions, courts
have applied doctrines of exclusive and primary jurisdiction or the federal
"filed rate" doctrine to provide insurers with defenses in state antitrust actions
involving insurance rates. 187 It is difficult to generalize about state
exemptions, except to say that in many states the exemption is a limited
one. 18
About a decade ago, state antitrust law became more significant for the
insurance industry. 8 9 State enforcement became more aggressive and more
coordinated,' 90 and some states repealed part or all of the provisions giving
state antitrust immunities to the insurance industry.' 9' In 1988, California
voters approved Proposition 103, which, inter alia, repealed the insurance
antitrust exemption and substituted two safe harbors limited to the exchange
of certain historical data and participation in state approved residual market
mechanisms. 92 Thereafter, the legislature restored an exemption for joint

182. INSURANCE ANTITRUST HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 34.
183. Id. at 35.
184. Id. at 36.
185. Hovenkamp, supra note 181, 241 ld, at 309-10.
186. INSURANCE ANTITRUST HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 36.
187. Id. at 37-38. In Keogh v. Chic. & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922), the Court held
that a private shipper could not recover treble damages against railways that had set uniform
rates filed with, and approved by, the Interstate Commerce Commission.
188. INSURANCE ANTITRUST HANDBOOK, supranote 5, at 37-38.
189. Id. at 33.
190. See id.(citing the multi-state investigation and federal court actions which resulted in
the Court's decision in HartfordFireIns. v. CaL, 509 U.S. 764 (1993)).
191. See id. (citing California, Texas, and New Jersey as prominent examples). See also
Macey & Miller, supra note 111, at 5-6.
192. See CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.03(a), (b) (West 1993).
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development of standardized policies.193 In 1990, New Jersey eliminated its
exemption forjoint ratemaking in the private passenger automobile insurance
market except for the "collection, compilation and dissemination of historical
data."' 194 In 1991, Texas eliminated its exemption based on the McCarranFerguson exemption and substituted an exemption for "actions required or
affirmatively approved by any statute of this state .

.

. or by a regulatory

agency of this state."' 95 Since this flurry of activity a little over a decade ago,
state legislatures appear to have given relatively little attention to insurance
antitrust issues.
It is impossible to summarize here the antitrust law of all fifty states, but
as a general proposition, insurers cannot be assured without careful study of
the law of individual states that they will enjoy the same breadth of immunity
from antitrust enforcement in the states as they do at the federal level. As a
result, insurers will be reticent to engage in collaborative conduct, particularly
if the perceived benefits from the conduct are relatively limited.
IV. THE IMPACT OF UNCERTAINTY

Although insurers are in the business of assuming and distributing risk,
they are risk averse, just like the individuals and firms who pay premiums to
transfer risk to them. Risk averse actors assign probabilities to the outcomes
of conduct, and if the expected benefits of an activity do not exceed the
expected losses, the activity will not occur.
As a matter of antitrust law, there is no impediment to individual life
insurers unilaterally rejecting of the use of genetic information in
underwriting.
The Sherman Act and its state counterparts subject
collaborative behavior between two or more market participants to antitrust
scrutiny, not unilateral conduct. But individual insurers are not likely to
renounce the right to use genetic information. As long as genetic information
is thought to have the potential to help insurers make more precise risk
classifications and more accurately price coverage, no insurer is likely to
unilaterally subject itself to the comparative disadvantage that goes with
renouncing the use of a viable, or potentially viable, rating tool. If
information has predictive power for risk classification, the insurer that ceases
to make distinctions based on genetic information will attract higher-risk

193. CAL. INS. CODE § 1855.3-.4 (West 1993). Whether this legislation comports with
Proposition 103 is arguable.
194. N.J. STAT.ANN. § 17:33B-31 (West 1994).
195. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.

§ 15.05(g) (Vernon 2002).
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insureds to its pools, and the insurer that uses the information to make
distinctions will be able to offer lower-risk insureds a more favorably priced
product, which in turn will cause lower-risk insureds to depart the pool of the
insurer that declines to make such distinctions. Ultimately, the insurer ceasing
to make distinctions will be forced to raise premiums to cover its higher-risk
pool, which in turn will drive more insureds out of the pool. Left uncorrected,
this adverse selection spiral will result in the collapse of the pool. The only
circumstances in which an insurer should seriously contemplate unilaterally
surrendering an underwriting tool is if the insurer is convinced that other
insurers will follow suit. But in a competitive market, the insurer should
anticipate that some other insurers will decline to do so in order to gain the
comparative advantages that accompany the use of an underwriting tool with
predictive power.
If unilateral surrender is not viable, the question becomes whether
concerted action by multiple insurers could achieve the same result. For the
same reasons discussed above, it is unlikely that insurers would be able to
forge an industry-wide moratorium on the use of genetic information because
of the industry's inability to effectively police the moratorium against
nonconforming insurers. The possibility of competitive advantage from
violating the moratorium means that the moratorium would not be accepted on
an industry-wide basis. In these circumstances, some insurers might endorse
the moratorium in principle but would be unwilling to subscribe to it knowing
that industry-wide adherence is impossible.
Moreover, even if such an agreement could be reached, the collaborative
conduct would raise the antitrust issues discussed earlier in this Article. The
discussion in the prior two sections of this Article suggests that collaborative
insurer standard-setting with respect to use of genetic information in
underwriting would probably pass muster under the federal antitrust laws
(provided the policies involved are insurance products, as opposed to financial
investment devices that do not involve the spreading and distribution of risk).
Greater uncertainty exists under state laws, particularly for insurers whose
business is multi-state. For insurers, because the costs of being wrong about
the lawfulness of such conduct are so significant, the conclusion that joint
conduct is probablylawful is insufficient to cause insurers to proceed with the
activity. A prominent insurance treatise explains the problem in this way:
The pervasive uncertainty about how antitrust principles
will be applied in different insurance contexts chills not only
the ardor of the more aggressive competitors but also the
willingness of many insurers to participate in collective
mechanisms to serve various public policy objectives. The
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threat of litigation is real. Antitrust law permits, even
encourages, such actions by providing for treble damages ....
The possibility of treble damages, the creativity of plaintiff
antitrust lawyers, the potential of large and hugely expensive
class action litigation, the civil and criminal penalties available
to the government, and the uncertain results when applying
antitrust law to insurance all tend to stifle
even activity that
96
might ultimately pass antitrust muster. 1
Only if collaborative conduct promises benefits more substantial than the risks
associated with possible antitrust liability would the rational insurer be
interested in joining the agreement. The cost-benefit calculus does not favor
concerted action to surrender the use of a viable underwriting tool.
The creation of an explicit statutory immunity for collaborative insurer
activity with respect to underwriting factors--or with respect to the use of
genetic information in particular-would remove the antitrust uncertainty, but
it would not alter the competitive forces that make a multi-insurer agreement
unlikely in the first place. As is often the case in insurance underwriting,
industry movement to a particular underwriting standard occurs only if the
movement is universally adopted, which will not occur absent compulsion by
some external authority (such as government regulation). Thus, the most
effective way to achieve a moratorium on insurers' use of genetic information
in life insurance underwriting is to prohibit the practice outright, as many
states have done with health insurance and some have done with life
insurance. This, however, turns the discussion full circle to the fundamental
question that is the root of this discussion: whether it is feasible and desirable
to prohibit life insurers from using genetic information in underwriting and, if
so, whether such prohibitions are politically achievable in the legislative
arena. It is because this question is so difficult to answer in the affirmative that
it becomes attractive to ask whether insurers could achieve the proscription by
simply agreeing to it among themselves. Unfortunately for those hoping for
the simple solution, the complexities and uncertainties of insurance antitrust
stand in the way, relegating those who wish a change in the status quo to take
their case to the political arena.

196. Jon S. Hanson, The RegulationofLife Insurance-Part2, in McGILL's LIFE INSURANCE
at 673-74 (Edward E. Graves ed., 3d ed. 2000).

